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ABSTRACT
The 2007 financial crisis can be viewed from various perspectives. First, it can be
explained in a wider macroeconomic context, for example by looking at the housing bubble.
Monetary policy can be explained according to the BB-NN and IS-LM models. Another way to
view the crisis is from a banking perspective by analyzing the changes in the financial market
and the deregulation of the banking industry. As the financial sector has grown enormously
over the past years, the principle of "Too Big to Fail" should also be scrutinized. Wall Street's
economic power was closely related to politics, and therefore it is very helpful to study the
financial crisis from a political perspective. After looking at these perspectives, the regulation
system should be considered in more detail, paying special attention to systemic risk. Apart
from these perspectives, there is still another way to look at the financial crisis: as a Black Swan
event. I will point out how the Black Swan event can provide a framework and meaning to
interpret the financial crisis. Lastly, the problem of credit rating agencies will be addressed, as
this is one of the main causes of the financial crisis. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the
financial crisis from various perspectives, and find an appropriate solution to prevent the next
financial crisis.
Thesis Supervisor: Simon H. Johnson
Title: Professor of Global Economics and Management
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The 2007 financial crisis can be viewed from many perspectives. In this thesis, I want to
analyze the causes of the crisis and suggest an appropriate way to prevent the next financial
crisis. More specifically, there are two main reasons why I wanted to study the financial crisis in
greater depth.
First, I am from South Korea, and in 1997, the Korean financial crisis took place. I was
15 years old, but I can remember how Korean society suffered from the crisis. The Korean
financial crisis was in some respects similar to the U.S. crisis of 2007. One of the causes of the
Korean financial crisis was the highly problematic banking system, which was also true for the
U.S. For example, both Asia and the U.S. had weak regulation and supervision of the financial
system. Both financial systems had become increasingly reliant on capital flows from sources
other than domestic consumer savings, and firms relied on financing from these systems. Moral
hazard became a problem in both systems as financial institutions' risk assessment was rather
poor. Finally, "crony capitalism" played a role in both systems. In both cases, the financial
system was highly leveraged, and when a negative shock occurred, the entire system rapidly
became undone. The major difference is that in Asia, most of the above problems were
concentrated in the banking system. In the U.S., these problems were located more in the
"shadow banking system" as well as in some of the banks.
Second, while I was employed at Woori Bank (headquartered in Seoul) in 2007, the bank
incurred substantial losses through collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) connected to Lehman
Brothers. Ultimately, from 2004 to 2007, Woori Bank wrote down $1.25 billion in CDO and
CDS investment losses. As a result, the senior manager of the Investment Department of the
bank had to resign, taking responsibility for all the losses. Among the big four banks in Korea,
Woori Bank incurred the most losses through the financial crisis.
Studying the basic economic and political factors of the financial crisis of 2007 can
create some pointers for the future. The crisis can be a chance for change. In this thesis, I will
explain from six perspectives how the economic crisis developed. We can obtain important
lessons from an analysis of these six perspectives, which are: Macroeconomic, Banking,
Political, Regulation, Black Swan Event, and Credit Rating Agencies. Most importantly, I will
analyze the fundamental economic and financial system in the United States.
Quoting a speech by Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, given at the 2000 conference
of the American Economic Association,' "Bank runs or their international analogues are not
driven by sunspots: their likelihood is driven and determined by the extent of fundamental
weaknesses." One can see from his speech that financial crises are the result of fundamental
policy weaknesses. Summers also said, "When well-capitalized and supervised banks, effective
corporate governance and bankruptcy codes, and credible means of contract enforcement, along
with other elements of a strong financial system, are present, significant amounts of will be
sustainable. In their absence, every very small amounts of debt can be problematic."
In this thesis, the Macroeconomic and Banking perspectives will be close to the
fundamental analysis while the Black Swan Event perspective will give us another angle for
analysis. The Political, Regulation and Credit Rating Agencies perspectives could provide some
lessons for creating a healthier economic climate.
Larry Summers, "International financial crises: Causes, prevention, and cures," The American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 90 (2000): 1-16.
Chapter 2. Macroeconomic Perspective
2.1 Housing bubble and global credit boom
The U.S. economy was slow to recover from the 2001 recession. The weakness of the
recovery led the Federal Reserve Board to continue cutting interest rates, pushing the federal
funds rate down to 1.0 percent by the summer of 2003. Mortgage interest rates followed the
federal funds rate on its downward trend: The average interest rate on 30-year fixed rate
mortgages fell to 5.25 percent in the summer of 2003.
Moreover, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan suggested that
homebuyers were wasting money by taking out fixed rate mortgages instead of adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs). In reality, people could afford larger mortgages even with adjustable rates at
the low rate of 2003.
These extraordinarily low interest rates accelerated the rise of house prices. From the
fourth quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2006, real house prices rose by an additional 31.6
percent-an annual rate of 7.1 percent. This fueled even more construction, with housing starting
to peak at 2,070,000 in 2005, more than 50 percent above the rate of the pre-bubble years. This
rise in house prices also affected savings and consumption. Consumption boomed in this period,
with the savings rate falling to less than 1.0 percent in 2005-2007.
As a consequence, the demand for housing increased, which led to a housing bubble.
This happened because the supply of housing was relatively fixed in the short run. People
expected the prices to continue rising, so they spent far more on houses than they would have
spent elsewhere.
In fact, on average, nationwide the inflation-adjusted house prices were essentially
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unchanged from 1953 to 1995.2 Moreover, Robert Shiller showed that real house prices had been
essentially unchanged for 100 years prior to 1995.3 By 2002, house prices had risen by nearly 30
percent after adjusting for inflation. It is evident that there was a speculative bubble and not a
fundamental reason for the rapid increase in prices. Another fact supporting this argument is that
rent had risen by less than 10 percent.
Therefore, there was a supply-side effect as housing starts rose substantially from the
mid-1990s to the late 1990s. By 2002, housing starts were almost 25 percent above the average
rate of the three years immediately preceding the start of the bubble, i.e. 1993-1995.4 This
indicated an over-supply of rental housing with the vacancy rate rising by almost 9.0 percent in
2002, compared with the rate of 7.5 percent in the mid-1990s.
In the case of the U.S., the collapse of the stock bubble helped to feed the housing
bubble, contrary to what occurred in Japan. People lost confidence in the stock market, which
made them turn to investment in housing as a presumably safe alternative to the stock market.
Between 2002 and 2006, the issue of asset-backed securities (ABS) more than doubled
to $840 billion, which was financed by domestic and foreign investors. Meanwhile, house prices
continued to rise, which meant that home owners could have access to credit much more readily
than before. Home mortgage lending rose by more than 50 percent during 2002-2005.
Specifically, the share of Alt-A and subprime loans surged to a third of new mortgage
originaitons in 2005, compared with less than 10 percent at the start of the decade. Moreover,
government-sponsored mortgage enterprises rapidly expanded both prime mortgages and the
2 D. Baker, "The run-up in house prices: Is it real or is it another bubble?" Washington, D.C.: Center for
Economic and Policy Research, 2002, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/the-run-up-
in-home-prices-is-it-real-or-is-it-another-bubble/
3 Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
4 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr407/q407press.pdf
purchase of nonprime mortgage-backed securities. As the housing bubble that was based on
credit inflated, real estate prices were rising and savings from disposable income turned negative
during 2005.
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The consumption-oriented U.S. growth led to a decrease in personal savings. However, in
2006 and 2007, as the housing downturn gathered pace, default rates on subprime mortgages rose
and then surged. Housing construction crashed, and residential investment comprised only a
small share of the GDP.
According to the Case-Shiller composite (20-city) index, the U.S. house prices hit their
peak in mid-2006; whereafter they fell by just over 30 percent. The inventory of unsold homes in
the U.S. market is over 11 months of new supply, versus an average of six months during nomal
periods.
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As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, after the surge, house prices started falling in the r
years, which has increased the number of homeowners with negative equity.
It also boosted foreclosures and resulted in a tightening of mortgage lending standards.
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Consequently, it raised the inventory of vacant homes and lowered the sales of houses.
These consequences caused household wealth to plummet after the housing boom.
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau
of Labor Statistics; Haver Analytics; and Fund staff calculations.
2.2 Monetary policy and macroeconomic performance
Unfortunately, central banks have historically been opposed to identifying and analyzing
housing bubbles. These banks tend to think that they have only short-term interest rates as a
policy instrument and that it has to be used for maintaining price stability. However, they cannot
reliably identify housing bubbles, and interest rates are too blunt an instrument to affect asset
prices without large collateral damage to the economy. When there is an asset bubble, a more
relaxed monetary policy can usually revive the economy at a relatively low cost.5
The Federal Reserve cut its policy rate by 100 bps over the second half of 2007;
s Morris Goldstein, Global Financial Surveillance and the Quest for Financial Stability, Peterson Institute
for International Economics (June 15, 2009).
nevertheless, the macrofinancial feedback loop intensified, and by the end of the year,
economy was in recession, and real GDP contracted sharply.
8.8 1I
2000 2001 2002 2003 2
Figure 8
Unemployment
at 741,000 in January.
400
0
-400
-800 -
004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 9
rose steadily and the unemployment rate surged, with monthly job losses
As a result, investment also fell.
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Moreover, consumer confidence held back consumption, which
very low levels. Following that, the record of imports collapsed.
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Although foreign demand for U.S. exports also dropped, the trade deficit was narrowed.
Figure 13: Source, Bureau of Economic Analysis: Bureau of Labor Statistics: U.S. Census Bureau;
Institute for Supply Management; Haver Analytics; and Fund staff calculations.
2.3 Monetary policy: IS-LM model
Figure 14 shows the federal funds interest rate from 2000 to 2006.
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Source: The Economist, October 18, 2007.
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The graph in Figure 14 describes how U.S. monetary policy was conducted earlier under
Alan Greenspan, where the Taylor rule was not followed. It shows that the actual interest rate
decisions fell well below what historical experience suggests should be the case. The line that
shows the actual interest rate decisions of the Federal Reserve (Fed) falls to one percent in 2003,
remains at that level until the start of 2004, and then starts rising steadily until 2006. The other
line shows what the interest rate would have been if the Fed had followed the Taylor rule.
According to this empirical measure, it can be said that monetary policy was too easy
during this period and was an unusually big deviation from the Taylor rule. As there has been no
greater or more persistent deviation in the actual Fed policy since the Great Depression, this
shows a clear evidence of monetary excesses during the period.
However, this arguably extreme monetary response could be considered appropriate
according to macroeconomic theory. The Fed actually described this decision as a purposeful
deviation caused by the fear of deflation that occurred in Japan in the 1990s.
It is useful to consider this policy against the IS-LM model. There was a sharp decrease in
real personal consumption of 3.8% in the 3rd quarter of 2008 and of 4.3% in the 4thquarter of
2008, which led to a significant shift to the left of the IS curve in the IS-LM model. The short-
run result was a substantial decrease in output, and if the target interest rate had been maintained,
output would have declined further to Y", as shown in Figure 15.
Central banks helped to stimulate domestic demand by decreasing interest rates that caused
a downward shift of the LM curve. This helped offset the shift of the IS curve to the left, thereby
encouraging the maintenance of output levels at Y"' in the short run, as indicated in the figure.
Interest LM LM'
Rate (r) Interest
Rate (r)
IsIs,is
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Figure 15 Figure 16
Following the IS-LM model, it can be said that the expansionary policy was appropriate
because the decreasing interest rate could offset the upward pressure on real interest rates from
an upward shift of the LM curve.
2.4 Large global imbalances
From a fundamental perspective, we can conclude that the financial crisis in the U.S.
was caused by external imbalances and their foreign counterparts.6 Global imbalances were
manifested through a substantial increase in the current account deficit of the U.S., which was
influenced by a substantial surplus in Asia, particularly in China, and in oil-exporting countries
in the Middle East and Russia. Figure 17 compares the current account balance and budget
balance of the U.S. and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
6 Richard Portes, "Global imbalances," in Mathias Dewatripont, Xavier Freixas, and Richard Portes
(Eds.), Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Regulation: Key Issues for the G20 (London: Centre
for Economic Policy Research, 2009).
Figure 17 Figure 18
Source: Country Report (U.S.), Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2009.
The savings and investment imbalances created the so-called savings glut in developing
countries and led to sizable net flows of capital from developing to advanced countries. The
United States was the primary recipient of these flows. The sizable U.S. current account deficits,
which exceeded 6 percent of GDP at their peak in 2006, required equivalent net capital inflows
from the rest of the world.
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Figure 19: Sudden Inflow of Capital to U.S. Monthly Cross-Border Financial Flows
Source: UST TIC Data.
These imbalances in the current account are often seen as a result of the relative
inflexibility of the currency regimes in China and some other emerging economies.
Figure 20: U.S. Exchange Rate: Broad Index
Source: Freelunch.com, U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
China's current account surplus, in particular, skyrocketed, and reserves rose to record
levels. The competitive force from China also urged other East Asian countries to limit the
appreciation of their currencies against the U.S. dollar, thereby boosting external surpluses and
reserve accumulation in these countries. Oil-exporting countries' current account surpluses also
rose because the increase in worldwide demand continued to push up oil prices. Consequently,
developing countries' external surpluses flowed back to the United States through net capital
flows. This financing helped fund a continuation of the consumption and housing boom, as well
as a steady rise in asset prices.
The U.S. current account deficit of the past 25 years has resulted in a negative net
international investment position (NIIP). In other words, the U.S. will need to make net
investment income payments. The NII stream remains positive despite the negative $2.4 trillion
NIIP as of 2007. The magnitude of the NIIP as a share of GDP and the magnitude of the NII
stream as a shrare of GDP are often seen as relevant parameters when considering the
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sustainability of the current account deficit.7 Other than the current account balance, additional
macroeconomic indicators are given in Figure 21.
7 Bertaut, Kamin, and Thomas (2008) emphasize that NIIP is a technically more correct perspective.
Figure 21
Source: Country Report (U.S.), Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2009
These macroeconomic indicators help to construct the BB-NN model of the imbalances
and capital inflows, as illustrated in Figure 22.
e/w =
competitiveness BB BB3
e/w =
competitiveness
Y = demand
Figure 22: U.S. pre-2008 Figure 23: U.S. end 2008
First, after the financial crisis, the current account deficit was sharply reduced in the short
run. William R. Cline calculated that the U.S. external imbalance would drop as low as 3.1
percent of GDP ($430 billion) in 2009, which would be its lowest level since 1998.8
8 C. Fred Bergsten, The Global Crisis and the International Economic Position of the United States,
Peterson Institute for International Economics (2009).
BB3
Y = demand
Second, the crisis sharply increased the budget deficit. Lower tax revenues and increased
spending, including for fiscal stimulus and other rescue operations, raised the U.S. internal
imbalance.
Third, the crisis created an unprecedented demand for safe dollar assets and particularly
U.S. Treasury securities. The dollar strengthened by about 13 percent, on average, including
about 20 percent against the euro. Yields on Treasury securities dropped sharply, even almost to
zero on short-term maturities during some periods.
Chapter 3. Banking Perspective
3.1 Change in financial market
Before 1980, the world of finance was fairly simple. Commercial banks made loans, took
deposits, and raised some of their funding in the money market.9
Investment banks helped large corporations to raise equity by managing stock offerings
and helped them borrow money by managing bond offerings and distributing newly created
securities to investors. This role was called "underwriting." The process entails that an
underwriter brings a new security issue to the investing public in an offering. The underwriter
will guarantee a certain price for a certain number of securities to the party that is issuing the
security in exchange for a fee. In this way, the issuer is secure in the knowledge that a certain
minimum will be raised from the issue, while the underwriter bears the risk of the issue. In
effect, underwriters buy the paper, convert it and resell it at a higher price to investors. The lead
manager is responsible for conducting due diligence of the issuer and helping to prepare the
relevant Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings.
In the 1960s, the roles regarding underwriting were clear: Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb,
Dillon Read, and First Boston were the leaders in managing deals and organizing syndicates
which actually sold the deals. This process could be perceived as risky, since there was always a
chance that the investment bank would have to sell off the securities at a loss. 10
Investment bankers had strong relationships with the CEOs of the corporations involved.
The investment banking team devoted a lot of time to the top executives because underwriting
9 Many commercial banks clearly issued bonds and stocks as part of their capital structure, while most
savings and loans then were mutuals.
10 Yves Smith, Econned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted
Capitalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 137.
seemed mysterious, there was serious money at stake, and the process was time-consuming.
Investment banks also carried out stock transactions for individuals or institutions that
wanted to trade. The commissions on trades were fixed, so they were absolutely secure sources
of income.
Finally, investment banks traded securities for their own benefit, or created markets in
securities that did not trade on exchanges, for example municipal bonds. Credit was mainly
provided to companies by commercial banks, and only very large companies raised money
directly from investors in the bond market. The bond business was far smaller in terms of
industry profits than stockbroking. Almost all buyers were large institutions that seldom traded
such as pension funds, insurance companies, and bank trust departments.
* Traditional roles of financial institutions
Institution Traditional role Prominent examples
(1980)
* Take deposits 0 Citibank
Commercial banks & Give loans to individuals 0 Chase Manhattan
and businesses 0 Bank of America
e Raise money for corporations
and government entities 0 Morgan Stanley
(underwrite stocks and bonds)
* Goldman Sachs
Investment banks 0 Trade securities or help others
(securities firms, to trade (create markets and * First Boston (acquired
broker-dealers) brokerage) by Credit Suisse)
* Help carry out or prevent 0 Salomon Brothers (now
corporate takeovers part of Citigroup)
(mergers and acquisitions)
0 Manage money for individuals,
corporations, endowments, e Insurance companies
Institutional investors foundations, and try to increase e Pension funds
value in a secure manner
0 Mutual funds
0 Subject to regulatory oversight
0 Manage money for individuals,
corporations, endowments, 0 Very few hedge funds,
foundations, and try to increase small venture capital
value quickly and LBO (later "private
Largely unregulated funds * Typically charge performance equity") funds grew
fees based on profits to investor, rapidly later in the
decade. Not yet seen as
in addition to annual fees
"institutional"
0 Minimal oversight
Table 1
Source: Smith 2010, 147 (see note 10).
The growth of the mutual funds industry in the 1960s was the first change that shifted
power and profit. Stocktrading carried fixed commissions, and brokers were making profit from
large trades. However, in 1968, volume discounts were introduced, and commissions were
deregulated completely in 1975, which did not bode well for securities firms. The bull market of
the 1960s ended suddenly when the NYSE composite index plunged by 37% from May 14, 1969
to May 25, 1970. According to the new rules, the volume of stock trades diminished at the same
time that commissions started falling. Therefore, many firms failed, and the survivors tried to
find new profit sources in a competitive industry.
Alongside these events, investment banks created merger and acquisitions departments
in the 1970s. For example, in 1974, a Canadian mining company, International Nickel Company
(Inco), started a wave of transactions with its hostile tender offer for Electric Storage Battery
(ESB), the world's biggest battery maker. At the time, hostile deals were hardly novel, but the
fact that Morgan Stanley, the leading investment bank, backed International Nickel was a new
development." As hostile takeovers grew popular, Morgan Stanley played a leading role in some
of the biggest deals of the decade. On the other hand, Goldman Sachs specialized in takeover
defenses in 1974, and it defended Electric Storage Battery against the hostile takeover bid.
Morgan Stanley's clients were likely to be the biggest companies that tended to be the
aggressors, while Goldman's clients were more likely to be the potential prey. This boosted
Goldman's reputation as an investment advisor.
In the bond business, it became critical to be big. Due to the inflation of the 1970s,
investors wanted to be able to trade quickly and in large volumes, with dealers who could
provide information on where the market was headed. Therefore, clients preferred to deal with a
" Myron Kandel, "Cannibals at work," The New York Times (May 10, 1987), http://www.nytimes.
firm that could handle sizable orders and that they believed had a better view of the market. The
term "bulge bracket" referred to the group of investment banks considered the largest and most
profitable in the world. By 1975, the institutional equity leader Goldman Sachs, bond
powerhouse Salomon Brothers, and retail kingpin Merill Lynch had joined this prized "bulge
bracket" at the expense of the fading white-shoe firms Kuhn Loeb and Dillon Read. 2
All securities firms felt the loss in safe revenue. An industry that was full of small players
had changed radically from the 1960s to the 1980s and became increasingly concentrated. The
main source of profit shifted away from low-risk stock commissions to a much higher risk
activity, as brokerage commissions fell as a percentage of industry revenues from 53.8% in 1972
to 17.3% in 1991."
At the same time, the role of commercial banks was also being eroded. Money market
funds, created in the 1970s, competed for bank deposits. In addition, the lifting of restrictions on
interstate banking meant local banks faced more competition from big regional players across a
broad range of services. In the 1990s, U.S. commercial banks also had to contend with more
aggressive competition from European banks that, unlike American banks, were participating in
both investment and commercial banking. Many of them enjoyed low-cost funding, and their
size was an advantage in some areas.14
Therefore, a new competitive dynamic emerged for both investment and commercial
banks. Deregulation and changes in banks' competitive environment not only forced
consolidation but also led to the pursuit of a greater scale of operations.
12 Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan; An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance
(New York: Grove Press, 1990; reprint ed., 2001), 625.
13 John 0. Matthews, Struggle and Survival on Wall Street: The Economics of Competition among
Securities Firms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12.
14 Smith 2010, 141.
By the 1980s, the critical capabilities were trading and institutional distribution. Under
these circumstances, commercial banks were struggling to survive in their own highly
competitive environment, and to preserve profits, they adopted new business models, taking on
more risk and using less equity to compete with the new entrants to the best of their ability." The
biggest change was their expansion into activities that were largely unregulated. This was later
described as the shadow banking system.
With the passing of the Glass-Steagall Act, the legislation separating commercial and
investment banking which was revoked in 1999; banks had already undergone many regulatory
changes, and commercial banks held large market shares in many capital market activities.
Through expansion, the transformation of the financial sector into new businesses
changed the face of the financial industry. All banks, regardless of their origins, became involved
in underwriting securities, manufacturing securities, trading securities, and trading derivatives.
The firms that were grounded in commercial banking, such as Citigroup, JPMorgan
Chase, and Bank of America, also had wide-ranging branch operations taking hundreds of
billions of dollars in deposits. Other firms, which originated from traditional investment banks
and brokerages, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch, funded their
operations through the capital markets. They now needed to enter the riskier and more profitable
world of finance. In 2004, Gary Stem and Ron Feldman, the president and senior vice president,
respectively, of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, found that "after becoming larger,
banks 'spend' their diversification benefit by taking on additional risk. For example, larger banks
hold assets in riskier categories, such as commercial and industrial loans, relative to smaller
"5 Michael Keeley, "Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking," American Economic Review
80, no. 5 (1990): 1183-1200.
banks."16 These banks' goal was to become big and to take on risk.
The main division in the industry was no longer between commercial and investment
banks, and large financial companies could dominate the financial services industry.
3.2 Brief history of banks
Glass-Steagall Act
From 1900 to 1929, banks in the U.S. artificially inflated the market by underwriting
corporate stock. This culminated in a crash, when all banks in the United States closed for four
days. More than 4,000 never reopened, which led to a run on the banks and the Great
Depression. The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in direct response to the Great Depression and
helped to stabilize and rebuild the nation's economy. It expanded the regulatory powers of the
Federal Reserve, prohibited banks from trading in corporate securities, and created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
> Trends in deregulation
- 1978, Marquette decision
The U.S. Supreme Court allowed banks to export the usury laws of their home state to
other states, which was the beginning of deregulation. Until the 1970s, banking was governed
primarily by state laws, and banks could operate only in their home states. A Nebraska bank
solicited customers from Minnesota, but charged them Nebraska's higher interest rate.
Minnesota's Marquette Bank filed a lawsuit to stop this practice, and the case was referred to the
16 Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail. The Hazards ofBank Bailouts (Washington:
Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 64-65.
Supreme Court. In its "Marquette Decision," the Court ruled that banks could export interest
rates to other states. This prompted banks to establish headquarters in states that would allow
them to charge the highest interest rates, which substantially boosted the tax base of those states.
To remain competitive, other states eliminated the usury rate ceiling. This effectively led to the
deregulation of state interest laws, also known as the usury law.
e 1980, Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
This legislation increased deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000, authorized new
authority for thrift institutions, and called for phasing out interest rate ceilings on deposit
accounts. This resulted in the abolishment of state caps on interest rates that could be charged for
primary mortgages. In addition, this legislation gave banks the incentive to approve mortgages
for people with problematic credit histories.
e 1982, Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
This Act deregulated thrifts almost entirely by allowing commercial lending and providing
a new account to compete with money market mutual funds. This was a Reagan administration
initiative that was passed with strong bi-partisan support.
e 1987, FSLIC insolvency
As a result of mounting institutional failures, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) declared the deposit insurance fund of the savings and loan industry insolvent.
e 1989, Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act
This Act abolished the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Those duties were transferred to the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), respectively. The
plan also created the Resolution Trust Corporation for resolving failed thrifts.
e 1994, Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
This Bill eliminated previous restrictions on interstate banking and bank branching. In
other words, it allowed bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state and allowed banks
to open branches in new states.
e 1996, Fed reinterprets Glass-Steagall
The Federal Reserve reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall Act several times, eventually
allowing bank holding companies to earn up to 25 percent of their revenues through investment
banking.
e 1998, Citigroup-Travelers merger
A commercial bank was merged with an insurance company that owned an investment
bank to form the world's largest financial services company, Citigroup Inc.
e 1999, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
With support from Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin, and his
successor Lawrence Summers, the Act repealed the Glass-Steagall Act in its entirety. This event
is also referred to as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. It broke down the walls
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between banking, insurance, and investment. In other words, it demolished the remaining
barriers separating commercial and investment banking and insurance.
e 2000, Commodity Futures Modernization Act
This Act was passed with support from the Clinton Administration, including the backing
from Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and bi-partisan support in Congress. The Act
prevented the Commodity Futures Trading Commission from regulating many over-the-counter
derivative contracts, including credit default swaps.
e 2004, Voluntary regulation
The SEC proposed a system of voluntary regulation under the Consolidated Supervised
Entities program, allowing investment banks to hold less capital in reserve and to increase their
leverage.
> Financial crisis
e 2007, Subprime mortgage crisis
Defaults on subprime loans sent shockwaves through the secondary mortgage market and
the entire financial system.
* December 2007, term auction facility
The special liquidity facility of the Federal Reserve made loans available to depository
institutions. Unlike lending through the discount window, there is no public disclosure on loans
made through this facility.
e March 2008, Bear Stearns collapse
The investment bank was sold to JPMorgan Chase with the assistance from the Federal
Reserve.
* March 2008, Primary dealer facilities
Special lending facilities opened the discount window to investment banks by accepting a
broad range of asset-backed securities as collateral.
* July 2008, Housing and Economic Recovery Act
Subprime borrowers' guarantees on new mortgages were guaranteed and a new federal
agency, the FHFA, was formed, which eventually placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under
conservatorship.
* September 2008, Lehman Brothers collapse
The investment bank filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
e October 2008, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
This Act authorized the Treasury to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program to
purchase distressed mortgage-backed securities and to inject capital into the nation's banking
system. The deposit insurance was also increased from $100,000 to $250,000.
e Late 2008, Money market liquidity facilities
Federal Reserve facilities were created to facilitate the purchase of various money market
instruments.
e March 2009, Public-Private Investment Program
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner introduced his plan to subsidize the purchase of
toxic assets with government guarantees.
The laws described above confirm the "deregulation" trend that began in the 1970s. It
meant that the federal government would no longer attempt to prevent large commercial banks
from becoming full-service national financial supermarkets. Policymakers since Alan Greenspan
have been choosing to rely on the "self-regulation" of financial markets-the concept that
market forces are sufficient to prevent fraud and excessive risk-taking.
The unprecedented amounts of money flowing through the financial sector were
increasingly concentrated in a handful of megabanks that formed the foundation of the new
financial oligarchy.1 7 This problem will be scrutinized in more depth in Chapter 4: Political
Perspective.
3.3 Financial sector growth
The size and economic influence of America's financial sector have grown enormously
over the past 30 years. In 2007-09, financial institutions became fewer but bigger. For example,
17 Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial
Meltdown (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 89.
JPMorgan Chase was the product of the mergers of Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Hanover,
Chase Manhattan, JPMorgan, Bank One, and First Chicago, followed by the bargain-basement
acquisitions of Bear Steams and Washington Mutual in 2008.18
In addition, the financial sector itself grew rapidly. In 1978, all commercial banks together
held $1.2 trillion in assets, which is equivalent to 53 percent of the U.S. GDP. By the end of
2007, the commercial banking sector had grown to $11.8 trillion in assets, or 84 percent of the
U.S. GDP. Moreover, investment banks grew bigger than commercial banks: from $33 billion in
assets, or 1.4 percent of the GDP, to $3.1 trillion in assets, or 22 percent of the GDP. Asset-
backed securities such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which barely existed in 1978,
accounted for another $4.5 trillion in assets in 2007, or 32 percent of the GDP. The debt held by
the financial sector grew from $2.9 trillion, or 125 percent of the GDP, in 1978 to over $36
trillion, or 259 percent of the GDP, in 2007.19
The financial sector expanded much more than households and nonfinancial companies.
Most of the growth in the financial sector was due to the increasing "financialization" of the
20
economy. Financialization can be explained as the transformation of one dollar of lending to
the real economy into many dollars of financial transactions. In 1978, the financial sector
borrowed $13 in the credit markets for every $100 borrowed by the real economy; by 2007, that
amount had grown to $51.2 In other words, the amount of borrowing by financial institutions
quadrupled for the same amount of borrowing by households and nonfinancial companies. These
numbers do not include the derivatives position because the derivatives are not conventionally
accounted for on bank balance sheets.
18 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 59.
'9 Federal Reserve Flow ofFunds, Table L.1, L.109, L.126, and L.129.
20 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 59.
21 Federal Reserve Flow ofFunds, supra note 13, Table L. 1.
To further illustrate the trend, derivatives did not exist in 1978 but grew to over $33
trillion in market value, or more than twice the size of the U.S. GDP, by the end of 2008.22
Between 1978 and 2007, the financial sector grew from 3.5 percent to 5.9 percent of the
economy.
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Figure 24: Real Corporate Profits, Financial vs Nonfinancial Sectors.
Sources: Bloomberg, LP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bureau of
Economic Analysis; FDIC; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; SNL Financial; Haver
Analytics; and Fund staff calculations.
As can be seen from the graph in Figure 24, from the 1930s until around 1980, financial
sector profits grew at roughly the same rate as profits in the nonfinancial sector. However, from
1980 until 2005, financial sector profits grew by 800 percent, adjusted for inflation. On the other
hand, nonfinancial sector profits grew by only 250 percent. Financial sector profits plummeted at
the peak of the financial crisis, but rebounded rapidly; by the third quarter of 2009, financial
22 Bank for International Settlements, Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics,
http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.
sector profits were more than six times their levels of 1980, while nonfinancial sector profits
were marginally more than double those of 1980.23
3.4 The growth of leverage and risk-taking
The combination of deregulation increased competition from securities firms and other
nonbanks. To preserve their profits, they wanted to move into largely unregulated areas, or the
so-called "shadow banking system". These changes increased the demand for the most
speculative securitized products.
In traditional banking, there were rules for credit, such as reserve and minimum equity
requirements. However, the ability of members of the system to discipline each other was the
only barrier to extending credit. In the period when credit products evolved, business cycles were
rather mild, market participants became more comfortable with innovations, and the hidden
dangers grew.
There were three interrelated types of "innovations" that affected credit:
* Securitization and other off-balance-sheet vehicles.
" Repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements, otherwise known as repos.
" Largely unregulated insurance contracts on debt securities (credit default swaps, or CDS).
( Securitization
Securitization takes place when an originator, a bank or any other type of lender, sells its
loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). An SPV can be specific to one originator or can hold
23 Ibid. Table 6.16. Ibid. Table 1.14.
Johnson and Kwak 2010, 60.
assets from various sources. For example, some types of unsecured consumer loans can also be
securitized.
Banks adopted this approach because securitization was less expensive than the traditional
process of making loans and retaining them. When banks hold loans, the interest rate needs to be
high enough to recoup the cost of equity and FDIC insurance, as well as allow for losses.2 4
From the mid-1990s, securitization grew rapidly. For example, the total amount of asset-
backed securities minus mortgage paper sold in the United States in 1996 was $168 billion; it
rose to $1.25 trillion in 2006, which was the year preceding the financial crisis.2 5According to
Citigroup, banks from around the world sold $2 trillion in non-agency asset-backed securities,
such as non-Ginnie, Fannie, and Freddie, that year. By contrast, global lending to corporations
was roughly $1.5 trillion. 2 6 Banks also simply sold whole unsecuritized loans and for every
27$1.00 of lending in 2006, $0.25 was sold.
Moreover, information was lost through securitizations and the vending of
loans. Sales and securitization of loans meant that banks had no reason to monitor
borrowers once they had offloaded the loans they had made to them.2 8
24 These factors were driving securitization from the mid-1980s. When the author worked at McKinsey,
the firm had some widely used charts that showed how significant the costs of FDIC insurance and
bank capital for on-balance-sheet lending were relative to the cost of securitization. The fact that the
rating agencies over time allowed higher effective leverage became important in the later phases of
the growth of securitization.
25 Gary Gorton, "Slapped in the face by the invisible hand: Banking and the panic of 2007." Paper
prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2009 Financial Markets Conference: Financial
Innovation and Crisis (May 11-13, 2009), 25.
26 Gillian Tett, "Finger of blame points to shadow banking's implosion," Financial Times (April 23,
2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/36b8e90c-3033-11 de-88e3-00144feadbc0.html.
27 Gorton 2009, 27.
28Gorton 2009, 26.
Repos
Repos are another type of collateralized lending that played an important role in the
credit crisis. Repo is short for "sale with agreement to repurchase." A repo is a contract in
which the seller of securities agrees to buy them back at a specified time and price. Repos
are typically overnight, so funds can be promptly redeemed if the repo lender decides not
to renew the repo.
Repos, which have been in existence for some time, are another way to lend against
an asset. However, even in the mid-1980s the repo market consisted solely of Treasury
securities, which are safe and highly liquid. Repos started becoming dangerous because the
demand for paper that could be sold as repos increased, and more risky paper became
widely accepted as collateral for repos.
Some have argued that the parabolic increase in demand for repos was, to a large
extent, due to borrowing by hedge funds.29 Indeed, Alan Greenspan reportedly used repos
as a proxy for the leverage used by hedge funds.30
Due to the strength of the demand, a shortage of collateral occurred as early as in
2001. The Bank for International Settlements warned that the scarcity was likely to result
in "appreciable substitution into collateral having relatively higher issuer and liquidity
risk."3 1
Dealers actually started to accept lower quality collateral for repos, and repos started
growing much faster than the overall economy. While there are no official figures for the
29 Smith 2010, 240.
30 Henry Maxey, "Cracking the credit market code," Ruffer LLP (April 2007), 18.
3 "Collateral in Wholesale Financial Markets: Recent Trends, Risk Management and Market Dynamic,"
Report prepared by the Committee on the Global Financial System working Group on Collateral
(2001), 2.
size of the market, repos by primary dealers, banks, and securities firms that can bid for
Treasury securities at auctions rose from roughly $1.8 trillion in 1996 to $7 trillion in
2008.32 Experts estimate that adding the repos from other financial firms would increase
the total to $10 trillion, although that somewhat exaggerates the amount of credit extended
through this mechanism as repos and reverse repos may be double counted.33 The assets of
traditional, regulated deposit-taking U.S. banks are also roughly $10 trillion, a part of
which is also double counting.
This largely unregulated credit market was becoming almost as important a funding
source as traditional banking.34 By 2004, it had become the largest market in the world,
surpassing bond, equity, and foreign exchange markets.3 5
@ CDS
CDS are the economic equivalent of credit insurance and are largely unregulated.
The party issuing the insurance will pay the party buying the policy if a corporation
specified in the CDS contract defaults on its debt or files for bankruptcy.
Similar to an insurance company receiving premiums for its policies, the party
providing the guarantee collects regular payments. Credit default swaps made it possible to
insure any pool of mortgage loans or mortgage-backed securities, thereby seemingly
eliminating the risk of default. 36
31 Smith 2010, 241.
3 Gorton 2009, 29-30.
14 Smith 2010, 241.
3 Maxey 2007, 18.
36 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 125.
CDS buyers are shorting the credit risk and profit when the borrower defaults. By
contrast, the sellers of CDS want the borrower to do well. "CDS sellers" can be compared
to bond holders in that they receive insurance premiums, just as bond holders receive
interest payments.
The first difference, however, is that CDS allows investors to take levered bets on
bond risks, as the collateral posting requirement is generally much lower than the cost of
buying the security. As a result, the bond and credit default swaps markets have become
linked by arbitrage. In fact, the CDS market often dictates the pricing of new bond issues,
as it is more liquid than the bond market.
The second difference between CDS and bond holders is that the creation of CDS is
not related to the real economy. For example, companies sell bonds if they need funding.
By contrast, CDS creation is limited only by the need to find two parties to a transaction.
Derivatives expert Satyajit Das noted, "On actively traded names CDS volumes are
substantially greater than outstanding debt." 37 Credit default swaps were used to create
"synthetic" CDOs when the demand for collateralized debt obligations began to surpass
the supply. However, several institutions, such as AIG and monocline bond insurers MBIA
and Ambac, eventually sold CDS at a rate that far outstripped their ability to honor their
guarantees in the event of stress conditions developing. These insurers were hugely
undercapitalized. As a result, if one insurer faced more claims than it could possibly pay
out, other institutions that relied on the insurer would also be undercapitalized.
The third difference is that no rules existed regarding "insurable interest," and
limiting the issuance of insurance policies became necessary. Only parties that had a
37 Satyajit Das, "The Credit Default Swap ('CDS') market - Will it unravel?" Satyajit Das Blog (May 30,
2008).
legitimate reason to protect against loss, so-called "insurable interest," could obtain
insurance policies.3 8 Just as a holder of a fire insurance policy for a house would not incur
severe losses if the house were torched, the owner of a CDS would be paid if the
underlying bond defaulted. The "insurable interest" concept, which is fundamental in
insurance regulation, was absent in the CDS arena.
3.5 Too big to fail
The concept of "too big to fail" (TBTF) in banking created three major problems for
society as a whole. The first problem is that when TBTF institutions fail, they need to be bailed
out by government and the taxpayer. The second problem is that TBTF institutions have a strong
incentive to take excessive risk, as they know that the government will bail them out in an
emergency. The third problem is that TBTF banks limit competition, which consequently has a
negative effect on the economy. Investors are willing to lend money to megabanks at lower
interest rates than to their smaller competitors because investors tend to think that megabanks
have an implicit government guarantee. This is why large banks could pay 0.78 percentage
points less for money than small banks in the wake of the financial crisis, which gives them a
substantial competitive advantage. 39 Dean Baker and Travis McArthur calculated that this hidden
subsidy was worth up to $34 billion for the 18 largest banks in 2009, accounting for roughly half
of their profit.40 This subsidy makes it harder for smaller banks to compete, deters new entrants,
38 V. Prashanth, "Necessity of insurable interest in insurance contracts," Corporate Law Cases, All India
Reporter, Nagpur, India (August 1, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302372
39 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 205.
40 Dean Baker and Travis McArthur, "The value of the 'too big to fail' big bank subsidy," Center for
Economic and Policy Research Issue Brief (September 2009).
and further strengthens the long-term process of consolidation and concentration in the financial
sector.
Chapter 4. Political Perspective
By March 2009, the Wall Street banks were more than just an ordinary interest group. In
the previous three decades they had become not only one of the wealthiest industries in the
history of the American economy but also one of the most powerful political forces in
Washington. Financial sector money poured into the campaign war chests of congressional
representatives. 41
In fact, money has long played an important role in American electoral politics. Since
the cost of campaigning has started to increase in the past few decades, money has been
becoming ever more important. Between 1974 and 1990, the cost of campaigning for a seat in
the House of Representatives grew from $56,500 to $410,000 for the average election winner.
From 1990 to 2006, it tripled to $1,250,000, and it more than doubled even after accounting for
inflation.42
The financial sector was the leading contributor to political campaigns in the past two
decades. Campaign contributions from the financial sector, including finance, insurance, and real
estate, grew much faster than overall contributions. They more than quadrupled from $61 million
in 1990 to $260 million in 2006. After excluding insurance and real estate, the financial sector
still contributed more than $150 million in 2006. On the other hand, the second-ranking industry
group, health care, contributed only $100 million in 2006.
Over the same period, contributions from the securities and investment industry
increased sixfold from $12 million to $72 million. The latter figure omits the millions of dollars
41 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 5.
42 Figure for 1974: Robert G. Kaiser, So Much Damn Money: The Triumph ofLobbying and the
Corrosion ofAmerican Government (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009). Other statistics:
OpenSecrets.org, A project of the Center for Responsive Politics.
in contributions from law firms that served the securities industry. In fact, from 1998 to 2008, the
financial sector spent $1.7 billion on campaign contributions and $3.4 billion on lobbying
expenses. The securities industry alone spent $500 million on campaign contributions and $600
million on lobbying.43
4.1 The Money Trust
After 1800, there were major advances in agricultural implements, canals,
telecommunications, steam power, railroads, chemicals, and other industries. By the end of the
19th century, American companies were almost in the technology-intensive industries that were
making it possible to produce more and better goods with fewer and cheaper inputs. During this
period, finance played a constructive and supporting role by providing the crucial connection
between savers, on the one hand, and people with productive investment opportunities, on the
other hand.
These innovations that changed the economic landscape also changed the political
landscape.44 New successful companies and industries could rapidly gain political representation
because there was greater social mobility in America compared with European societies. By the
late 19th century, the Senate had become known as the "Millionaires' Club"; buying political
support with cash was considered by many to be a reasonable extension of normal business
practice.45
43 Essential Information and Consumer Education Foundation, Sold Out: How Wall Street and
Washington Betrayed America (March 2009), http://www.wallstreetwatch.org.
44 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 22.
4' Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, supra note 20, Chapter 7; Matthew Josephson, The Robber
Barons (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1934).
Railroad wealth was the most noticeable example of how the new money made its way
into politics during the late 19th century. Railroad barons and their industrial allies acquired
great political power, and they dominated the Senate. Two of their strongest allies were Senator
Mark Hanna and Nelson Aldrich, important power brokers in the Republican Party, who
controlled the White House for eight years, from 1867 to 1913. Moreover, they had a Senate
majority for two years, from 1883 to 1913. Hanna managed William McKinley's successful
1896 presidential campaign and controlled the Republican Party machine even into the Theodore
Roosevelt years. Aldrich was one of the most powerful men in the Senate and largely dictated its
position on government regulation of industry and banking.46
Political representation in rising industrial interests is preferable to ossified social
structures that restrict innovation and keep new people away from the machinations of power.47
However, at the same time, the openness of the American political system has always made it
possible for the business elite to use its political power to set up the economic playing field in
their favor.48
Large corporates welcomed the 1896 election of McKinley as president, but they were
not favorably disposed toward his second-term vice president and successor, Theodore
Roosevelt, who adopted "trust-busting" as a signature policy and made improved supervision of
large corporations a major theme of his 1901 State of the Union address.4 9
46 Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich (New York:
Broadway Books, 2003), 239-40; Hosfstadter, American Political Tradition, supra note 20, Chapter
7; Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, Nelson W. Aldrich, supra note 38; Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex
(New York: Random House, 2001).
47 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective,"
American Political Science Review 100 (2006): 115-31.
48 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 23.
49Roosevelt, "State of the Union Message," supra note 1.
Following the tradition of Jefferson and Jackson, Roosevelt opposed concentrated
industrial power for political reasons; he believed that dominant private interests were bad for
democracy and economic prosperity. He helped change the way that Americans thought about
big business.
On the other hand, Nelson Aldrich argued in an influential 1909 speech that a central
bank should act as a lender of last resort in a crisis.50 This proposal by Aldrich was politically
controversial as it was construed as a trick for taxpayers to finance banks and protect them from
the consequences of their high-risk activities.
Despite Roosevelt's success against the trusts, and even with the support of one of its
leading advocates, Louis Brandeis, who acted as an adviser to President Wilson, the movement
to constrain the power of big banks failed. In a 1913 article entitled "Our financial oligarchy,"5 1
Brandeis, a prominent lawyer and future Supreme Court justice, spoke strongly in favor of
constraining banks. He accused the powerful investment banks of using customer deposits and
other money that passed through their hands to take control of large companies and to promote
the interests of those companies.
Brandeis said: "We believe that no methods of regulation ever have been or can be
devised to remove the menace inherent in private monopoly and overweening commercial
power."s2 He advocated that large concentrations of industrial or financial power should be
broken up.
50 Aldrich, "The Works of the National Monetary Commission," supra note 38.
5 Louis Brandeis, "Our financial oligarchy," Harper's Weekly, November 1913.
51 Quoted in Urofsky, Louis Brandeis, supra note 66, 346.
4.2 Economic elites and political system
By the late 19th century, industrialization had created powerful economic elites that
held political power at all levels. They had supporters who had substantial control in the Senate,
the Republican Party, and the presidency.
The legislative failures of the Reagan administration in the 1980s showed that Wall
Street had no influence in Washington at the time. Rather, academic finance provided the
intellectual justification for financial non-regulation, and the Reagan Revolution provided a
political ideology for a weak government. Of course, some academic theories and incipient
deregulation helped finance industry, but the creativity and competitiveness of talented bankers
also drove the revolution. Their innovations created new money, and it has fueled the wealth of
the financial sector over the past three decades. Consequently, it also helped Wall Street become
a dominant political force in Washington.
4.3 Campaign contributions
The largest commercial and investment banks were also the largest source of political
campaign money. The companies in the banking sector that contributed the most money to
campaigns in 1990 were Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers, Barnett Banks, Citibank,
JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley. In 2006, the biggest contributors were Goldman, Citigroup,
Bank of America, UBS, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley.53
Phil Gramm, who was appointed chair of the Senate Banking Committee in 1999, raised
more than twice as much money from the securities industry than from any other industry. In
5 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 91.
1998, Alfonse D'Amato, Chair of the Senate Banking Committee before Gramm, was the
primary beneficiary of the securities industry. In 2007-2008, Christopher Dodd, Chair of the
Senate Banking Committee, received $2.9 million from the securities industry. It was more than
three times as much as any other senator who was not a major presidential candidate. The only
senators who received more than Dodd were the much more visible presidential candidates
Barack Obama, John McCain, and Hillary Clinton.
The security industry was also an important contribution source for Barney Frank, who
was Chair of the House Financial Services Committee. Charles Schumer, who was a member of
the House Financial Services Committee and later a member of the Senate Banking Committee,
had been the securities industry's favorite member of Congress over the decades. Also, The New
Yorker has aggressively championed Wall Street over the years.54
The 1990s was a period of growing financial sector contributions, and powerful members
of Congress sponsored legislation on the financial sector's wish list. For example, Gramm added
his name to the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which largely superseded the Glass-Steagall
separation of commercial and investment banking. Gramm was also the major force behind the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which prohibited federal regulation of over-the-
counter derivatives. 55 Schumer was a major proponent of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and in
2001, he and Gramm proposed legislation to halve the fees paid by financial institutions to the
56SEC. This legislation was passed in the same year. Gramm left the Senate in 2002 to become a
vice chair at UBS Warburg.
5 Eric Lipton and Raymond Hernandez, "A champion of Wall Street reaps benefits." The New York
Times (December 13, 2008). http://222.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/business/14schumer.html.
ss Johnson and Kwak 2010, 92.
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4.4 Financial lobby
In the past twenty years, the financial services industry has become an extremely
powerful lobby in Washington, with the ability to win votes in both Republican and Democratic
Congresses. In April 2009, Senator Richard Durbin said, "The banks are still the most powerful
lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place."57 Although this remark was made after
the crisis, no one thought he was saying anything extraordinary.
In 2009, Michael Lewis said:
It does feel a lot to me like the process has been queered by political influence and
it's a very curious kind of political influence. Because it isn't maybe always as simple
as bribery, campaign contributions, and that kind of thing. I think that we've had
twenty-five years of the Goldman Sachses of the world ruling the world, and the
people like Tim Geithner, when they leave office, the way they make their living... is
to go to work for a financial institution for huge sums of money; that people have
trouble getting their mind around a world where that's not the way the world works,
and there is maybe a slight quickness to believe that the world can't function without
Goldman Sachs.58
The political influence of Wall Street helped create the laissez-faire environment for the
big banks to become bigger and more risk-taking by 2008. The political influence also meant that
when the government did rescue the financial system, it did so on terms that were favorable to
57 Ray Hanania, interview, Radio Chicagoland, April 27, 2009.
58 Michael Lewis (lecture, Hudson Union Society, New York, NY, June 1, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/18/michael-lewis-attcks-gol-n_217542.html.
the banks. The major banks were already entrenched in the heart of the political system, and the
government decided it needed the banks at least as much as the banks needed government.59
Wall Street could have become even more powerful if the government had deregulated
derivatives. However, in 1994, big losses were incurred as a direct result of derivatives in Orange
County, Procter & Gamble, and Gibson Greetings. Therefore, Congress considered the
regulation of derivatives which resulted in a major lobbying effort by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) against this proposal. Treasury Under-Secretary Frank
Newman also urged Congress not to regulate derivatives. 60 Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
said, "Derivatives are perfectly legitimate tools to manage risk. Derivatives are not a dirty word.
We need to be careful about interfering in markets in too heavy-handed a way." 61 In addition,
ISDA was supported by Alan Greenspan and the Clinton administration.
4.5 American oligarchy
The basic principle underlying an oligarchy is that economic power yields political
power.62 The Wall Street banks are a group that has political power because of its economic
power, and these banks use that political power for their own benefit. In this sense, they are the
new American oligarchy. High profits and bonuses in the financial sector flowed into the
political scene through campaign contributions and lobbying. Moreover, in an era where free
59 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 6.
60 Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (New York:
Henry Holt, 2004), 153-54.
61 Cited in Tett, Fool's Gold, supra note 6, 39.
62 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 74.
market capitalism reigned triumphant, those profits and bonuses also supported the credibility
and influence of Wall Street.
4.6 Solution
The appropriate solution would be to break up financial institutions so that they are not
"too big to fail." Banking executives have spent the past twenty years making their banks as big
as possible, and, naturally, the CEOs of large banks are not amenable to the idea of seeing that
broken down. In the Washington Post, Jamie Dimon wrote, "While the strategy of artificial
limits may sound simple, it would undermine the goals of economic stability, job creation and
,63
consumer service that lawmakers are trying to promote." In addition, in an interview, Lloyd
Blankfein of Goldman Sachs said, "Most of the activities we do, and you can be confused if you
read the pop press, serve a real purpose. It wouldn't be better for the world or financial system to
change the firm's activities." 64
However, there are some good reasons for breaking up big banks. First, if there are no
financial institutions that are too big to fail, there will be no implicit subsidies favoring some
banks and not others. That will mean that creditors and counterparties would ensure that banks
do not take on too much risk, and banks will be less likely to engage in excessive risk-taking that
could cause the next financial crisis. In addition, banks that do fail will not have to be rescued at
the taxpayer's expense.65
63 Dimon, "No More 'Too Big to Fail,"' supra note 34.
64 Quoted in Christine Harper, "Blackfein Defends Goldman Sachs Against Breakup," Bloomberg
(November 10, 2009).
65 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 211.
Second, despite the widespread assumption in New York and Washington that big banks
provide societal benefits, there is no proof that these benefits exist, and neither does
quantification of the magnitude of these alleged benefits. 66
In recent years, too many financial firms have been rescued with taxpayers' money, and
the firms that benefited have political power, which means they could engage in higher-risk
business practices to make their profits. Moreover, the government provides deposit insurance
and other safeguards to these firms.
To prevent the next financial crisis, the government should not provide such safeguards.
However, this will create unfairness because banks can benefit from taxpayers' help even if they
use the money for their own profit.
Similar to the "Volcker Rule" that President Obama proposed, banks should no longer be
allowed to engage in activities that are unrelated to their customers. In addition, the U.S.
government should prevent further consolidation in the banking industry.
A more specific solution would be limiting the size of banks by reverting to the Glass-
Steagall Act. Under this Act, there was a size limit rule, according to which each bank could not
hold more than 10 percent of total retail deposits in 1994, but this rule has been waived in 2009
for JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.67
Perhaps it would be prudent for the U.S. government to set a size limit, which could be a
percentage of the U.S. economy such as GDP. In 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the
Next Financial Meltdown, it is stated that the limit should be no more than 4 percent of GDP for
all banks and 2 percent of GDP for investment banks. However, members of the Obama
66 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 213.
67 David Cho, "Banks 'too big to fail' have grown even bigger: Behemoths born of the bailout reduce
consumer choice, tempt corporate moral hazard," The Washington Post (August 28, 2009).
administration have said that it is impossible to "turn back the clock." 68 In the mid-1990s, large
commercial banks such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and NationsBank had.
assets of about 3-4 percent of the U.S. GDP. Investment banks' assets were equivalent to 2
percent of the U.S. GDP.
If the government applies such a size limit rule, only six banks, listed below, will be
affected:
" Bank of America: 16 percent of GDP
" JPMorgan Chase: 14 percent of GDP
" Citigroup: 13 percent of GDP
* Wells Fargo: 9 percent of GDP
e Goldman Sachs: 6 percent of GDP
" Morgan Stanley: 5 percent of GDP 69
If Congress cannot break up the largest bank, the future will depend on these six banks.
68 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 216.
69 "Company annual and quarterly reports: GDP data from Bureau of Economic Analysis," National
Income and Product Account (September 2009, Table 1.1.5).
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asD.
Chapter 5. Regulation Perspective
A crisis in the financial sector and its effects on the economy are worrisome. In fact,
financial regulations are focused on limiting each institution's risk, but they are not adequately
focused on systemic risk. As a result, while individual risks are properly regulated, the system
itself remains fragile and vulnerable to large macroeconomic shocks. After the financial crisis,
the financial sector was forced to measure systemic risk and to suggest new regulations for
limiting such risk.
There are two challenges related to the regulation of systemic risk. First, systemic risk
must be accurately measured. Second, each firm should be charged the correct price for its
contribution to systemic risk based on sound economic theory. The framework of systemic risk
regulation is analyzed in this section to find a way to respond to these two challenges.
5.1 Why systemic financial risk must be regulated
Systemic risk can be broadly thought of as the failure of a significant part of the financial
sector. It is helpful to examine the failure of Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers with respect to
government's intervention.
On March 14, 2008, the government helped manage JPMorgan Chase's purchase of Bear
Stearns by guaranteeing $29 billion in subprime-backed securities. Without this involvement,
Bear Stearns would have had to declare bankruptcy. Although Bear Stearns was the smallest of
the major investment banks, it had a high degree of interconnectedness with other parts of the
financial system. The bank was a major counterparty risk for three reasons: First, it was an
important player in the repo market; second, it was the leading prime broker for hedge funds;
and, third, it was a major counterparty in the CDS market.
On September 12, 2008, the government attempted to purchase Lehman Brothers
(Lehman) through other financial institutions, but these attempts failed without any direct
government support. Lehman went bankrupt and, as it contained considerable systemic risk, it
led to a near collapse of the financial system.
Many people argue that the cause of the financial crisis was the failure of the government
to intervene to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman. It is not clear why the government allowed
Lehman to fail. The government argues that Lehman could not be rescued because it did not
have adequate collateral to post for accessing these facilities. Similar to Bear Stearns, Lehman
was a major player in various parts of the capital market. Its bankruptcy opened up the
possibility that similar firms could also go bankrupt, causing a potential run on their assets. This
led to Merrill Lynch selling itself to Bank of America. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs's
five-year CDS protection rose from 250 bps (basis points) to 500 bps and from 200 bps to 350
bps, respectively, and their stock prices fell by 13.54 percent and 12.13 percent, respectively,
from Friday, September 12, to Monday, September 15, 2008. Both these investment banks
adopted the status of bank holding companies.
The government's response to Lehman's failure might be an indication of their intention to
limit moral hazard. However, in the Lehman case, it became clear that the government would not
let any other large financial institution fail. Therefore, moral hazard had been strengthened, not
weakened. From the above two examples, it is evident that systemic risk should be regulated.
5.2 Externalities
Systemic risk can be considered a negative externality imposed on each financial firm.
Externalities are when a firm holds large amounts of illiquid securities, concentrates its risk into
particular ones, such as subprime-mortgage assets, or places high amounts of leverage on its
books to drive up excess returns. Lastly, an example of an externality is a case when a firm has
an incentive system to manage by risk/return tradeoff, and it does not take into account the result
of the risk it imposes on other financial institutions.70
5.3 Implicit guarantees
In addition to externalities, implicit government guarantees also necessitate the regulation
of systemic risk. Implicit guarantees create moral hazard in three ways:
1. "Too big to fail" creates a bias toward firms that are too large and excessively
leveraged
2. "Too interconnected to fail" causes excessive counterparty risk
3. "Too many to fail" causes firms to take on too much systemic risk
The moral hazard and cost of bailouts are significant when considering regulation
according to each firm's contribution to systemic risk. Yet, the problem of how to measure
systemic risk remains. 71
70 Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed
System (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley&Sons Inc., 2009), 286.
7 Acharya and Richardson 2009, 288.
5.4 Measuring systemic risk
The common risk management tools, value at risk (VAR) and expected shortfall (ES),
seek to measure the potential loss incurred by a firm in an extreme event. The aggregate loss can
be broken down by using marginal VAR and marginal ES. By estimating each bank's marginal
ES for an aggregate shock, we can obtain its contribution to aggregate risk.
To estimate this, each firm should collect historical data on losses experienced for several
intervals. We can calculate the contribution of each firm to aggregate losses, which is a measure
of the systemic risk posed by the firm. Moreover, this method can be used for forecasting future
crises. Calculations should be performed on a daily basis for financial firms.
One specific result explains the contributions of each firm to systemic risk for the period
2006-2007. The contributions take into account the size of the firm and its extreme downside
correlation with the overall market.72 These calculations were made by Lester, Pedersen, and
Philippon in 2008. They used equity market value to measure the risk of the worst 5 percent of
decreases in market value of all publicly traded stocks. Based on these aggregate shock data,
they estimated each financial firm's systemic risk as its average loss during a crisis. Thereafter,
they ranked the companies by their marginal ES contribution, as indicated in Figure 25, where a
positive correlation exists between the size of the firm and the expected shortfall of the market.
72 Lester, Pedersen, and Philippon, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)'s daily stock and index
database for 2006 and 2007, where financial companies (banking, insurance, real estate, and trading)
are identified as those listed on the New York Stock Exchange in the SIC code range of 6000 to 6999,(2008).
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5.5 Stress tests and scenario analysis
Measuring systemic risk with statistical methods has some limitations, which can be
balanced with stress test and scenario analyses. Stress tests can be used to assess risk
concentration and interconnected counterparty risks. This method can also be used by a regulator
to estimate the consequences of the failure of a large institution. In addition, a scenario analysis
can limit excessive risk-taking in good times. For example, if the volatility remains low for
prolonged periods, statistical measures of risk go down. Therefore, risk-taking becomes
procyclical, and this increases the possibility and severity of a financial crisis.
Chapter 6. Black Swan Event Perspective
In his book The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb defines a "black swan" as follows:
First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because
nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an
extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct
explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.
Taleb discusses the financial crisis as a black swan in his book. His view is that the
financial crisis could lie outside the realm of regular expectations. Taleb further says, "Anything
that relies on correlations is charlatanism." 73
Risk regulation by VaR was discussed in the previous chapter. However, as Taleb points
out, even when quantitative analysts try to determine extreme events in any market, they are still
looking through the rearview mirror, and they have very few data points to work with. In fact, in
some markets, one observation will account for 80%, even 90%, of the "weight" in the
estimation of the magnitude of the tail risk.74 If one or two unusual events occur, we do not know
if they are once-every-seven-year storms or once-every-ten-thousand-year storms.
Taleb places the "fat tail" problem faced by banks in, what he calls, the fourth quadrant,
where extreme events are hard to assess and the decision about how much to risk involves
multiple tradeoffs. Taleb argues that it is dangerous to use statistics in fourth-quadrant situations
as they cannot yield reliable results.75
7 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed. (New York:
Random House, 2010).
74 4Nassim Nicholas Taleb, "The fourth quadrant: A map of the limits of statistics," Edge (September 15,
2009), http://www.edge.org/3rd culture/taleb09/taleb09 index.html.5 Taleb 2010.
Taleb considers assessing the shortcomings of statistical models to define the odds of an
extreme move within a single market. In fact, changes in the financial services industry have
increased the wideness and intensity of "tail" events and the correlation among markets in stress
events.
Distortions based on misguided faith in financial models played a central role in the
crisis. The focus on the large-scale losses that resulted from the misapplication of seemingly
advanced risk management and pricing technologies may obscure a far more basic fact than
simply viewing so-called financial innovations with a great deal of skepticism. It is that the
whole edifice of modem finance, even the mundane sort that retail investors use to manage their
portfolios, is rotten.
The investment approaches from financial economics greatly understate the risk of
markets. Benoit Mandelbrot discovered, and numerous analysts have since confirmed, that
specific markets show much greater price swings than posited by standard theories.76
Although some quantitative analysts will argue that they have fixes for the fat tail
shortcoming in the models, Taleb gathered price data for a large set of market and economic
variables and found that one single outlier would largely dictate how "fat tail" adjustments were
set.77 However, how do we know if that one outlier will be similar to the next one that arises?
For example, economists and lay people may be looking at the Great Depression to explain the
present crisis. However, relying on a single case is frequently misleading.
The only way we can imagine a future that is similar to the past is by assuming that it
76 E.g. GARCH, which is Generalized Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. It is an
econometric model that is used to forecast the volatility of the returns on stock prices. It uses past
variances to estimate current variances, and hence troubles of "the past may not be a good proxy for
the future" shortcomings endemic within financial economics.
77 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, "The fourth quadrant: A map of the limits of statistics," Techonical Appendix,
Edge (September 15, 2008), http://www.edge.org/3rd cUlture/taleb08/taleb08 index.html.
will be an exact projection of it and, hence, predictable. This would assume that, just as we know
with some precision when we were born, we would know with equal precision when we will die.
The notion of a future mixed with chance, rather than being a deterministic extension of our
perception of the past, is a mental operation that our mind cannot perform. Chance is too fuzzy
for us to be a category in itself. There is an asymmetry between the past and the future, and it is
too subtle for us to understand with ease.78
The consequence of this asymmetry is that, in people's minds, the relationship between
the past and the future does not draw on the lessons from the relationship between the past and
the past preceding it. There is a blind spot: When we think of tomorrow, we do not frame it in
terms of what we thought about yesterday or the day before yesterday. When we think of
tomorrow, we just project it as another yesterday. This introspective defect makes us fail to learn
the difference between our past predictions and subsequent outcomes.
78 Taleb 2010, 193.
Chapter 7. Credit Rating Agencies Perspective
7.1 CDO structure
In 2001-2003, subprime mortgage bonds seemed to be a solution to the yield-hungry
investors.79 Figure 26 is a simplified version of a typical ABS CDO structure.
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Figure 26: Typical ABS CDO structure
From left to right in the figure, subprime loans were first pooled together. The principal
and interest payments were then allotted to various classes of securities; the "subprime mortgage
bonds" were rated from AAA to the "BB/NR," with NR being "not rated" or the "equity" layer.
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The key difference between these CDOs and other types of structured credit is that they
were resecuritizations, made up largely of the unwanted parts of subprime bonds. The CDOs that
took the better parts of the unpopular .pieces, the junior AAA, AA, and A layers, were called
"high-grade" CDOs. There is another type, the so-called "mezz" ABS CDOs, or simply "mezz"
CDOs, which used the BBB or "mezzanine" layer from subprime bond issues.
The magic of structured credit took pools of loans and turned them into tranches with
different credit ratings. As with other structured securities, the bulk of the value of the resulting
CDO, meaning the total cash paid to purchase each of the various tranches, was by far mostly in
the AAA-rated tranches, which typically accounted for 75% to 80% of the total proceeds.
The very worst tranche, the one that incurred the first losses, was the equity tranche, so
called because it was not rated, which usually accounted for 4% to 7% of the value of the deal.
Next were the mezzanine tranches, rated as a BBB, the lowest investment grade, and usually
accounting for 10% of the deal's value.
Finally, the BBB tranches of these CDOs were securities that virtually no one wanted.
Often, these unpopular tranches went into CDOs later. In other cases, these tranches were
attractive to some exotic investors.
In these second-generation pools, the riskier cash flows from the original subprime bonds
were again allocated to various tranches, many of which were then rated AAA. In other words,
these CDOs took the worst risk exposures from weak mortgages and used financial technology to
create new instruments, of which 75% to 90% were awarded an AAA rating.
By contrast, the similar-sounding collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) simply took a
large pool of takeover loans and tranched the payments on them without resecuritization.
Therefore, although CLOs were created from a riskier type of loan, the end result was, in most
cases, less fraught with risk than CDOs.
How could anyone at the time have convinced him- or herself that these CDOs, junior
exposures to low credit quality instruments, could produce AAA-rated paper?
A key driver of the rapid growth of the CDO market was that demand for AAA securities
exceeded supply.8 0 The willingness in capital markets to hold large volumes of AAA-rated
structured credit instruments, no matter how complex, was not the only reason for the so-called
"infinite bid"81 for this product in the later stages of the lending boom.
In June 2005, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), an industry
association for over-the-counter derivatives dealers, allowed credit default swaps to be written on
asset-backed instruments, thereby subprime mortgage bond tranches that went into CDSs. In
2006, Markit, a financial information services company, launched a credit default swaps index
which referenced a basket of twenty subprime mortgage issues and provided different prices for
each tranche. It thus provided another way to hedge, as dealers and investors could buy and sell
protection on particular tranches of the index.
Of course, CDOs had often used insurance even before the ISDA amendment. However,
insurers such as AIG and so-called monoclines such as MBIA and Ambac provided AAA
ratings. They kept providing credit enhancement for the top tranches, but the new players that
emerged could also provide protection for risky tranches. Moreover, they could enlarge the pool
of possible suppliers of credit and lower the price of borrowing. This opened up the possibilities
for hedge funds and the proprietary trading desks of investment banks, which were hedge fund-
like units that speculated with a trading house's money. They could shorten mortgage bond
80 Smith 2010, 245.
81 Smith 2010, 253.
tranches and use CDSs to construct trades that mimicked being short and rated tranches of an
ABS CDO, such as the super senior, or the BBB layer.
Alongside this, the demand for CDOs was insatiable in 2005 and 2006. Using the new
market in lower tranche CDSs, packagers found a way to cope with the dearth of supply of raw
CDO material. They created and sold impressive volumes of so-called synthetic collateralized
debt obligations.
In the early years of the explosive growth of collateralized debt obligations, which were
created heavily from residential mortgages, the end buyers of the AAA tranches of CDOs were
typically pension funds and insurance companies that were hungry for AAA paper that offered
higher-than-usual yields. Even with strong demand for the AAA tranches, the growth of the
product had historically been constrained by the need to find someone to take on the "bad lower"
layers. The CDO manager, who identified and vetted instruments that constituted the deal, was
expected to take at least some of the equity tranche; hedge funds were the usual suspects to make
up the balance.
However, in late 2005, those patterns started to change. Demand from historically cash
AAA buyers started to soften, and CDOs looked set to become the victims of their own success.
7.2 Credit rating system
In 2003, the subprime mortgage credit default swap was a nonstandard insurance
contract. Inside Morgan Stanley, the subprime mortgage lending boom created a who-put-
chocolate-in-my peanut-butter moment.82 As a leader in this field, Morgan Stanley's financial
intellectuals had been training the rating agencies.
Throughout the financial crisis period, there were various market problems. Mortgages
were originated without sufficient documentation or with overly optimistic underwriting
assumptions and then sold off in complex derivative securities that, certainly in retrospect, were
rated too highly by credit rating agencies. Individuals and institutions took highly risky positions
either through a lack of diversification or through excessive leverage ratios.
Due to these problems, the credit rating system warrants discussion. The behavior of
credit rating agencies can be one of the reasons for the financial crisis. It can be said that the U.S.
credit rating system is ineffective and has conflicts of interest.
The major credit rating agencies, Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch, played a
crucial role in making decisions. As financial markets grew more complex, the role of the credit
rating agency has become more important. In the subprime-related market, there are many
structured financial products, for example, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs), and CDOs invested in other CDOs. Between 2002 and 2007, Wall
Street issued many of those new financial products, which were too complex to understand. It
was essential for these products to have a high rating because it could instill confidence in risk-
averse investors. By 2006, Moody's business ratings of structured financial products accounted
for 44 percent of its revenue, compared with 32 percent from its traditional corporate-bond rating
business. 83 It was also reported that "roughly 60 percent of all global structured products were
82 Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), 201.
83 Joshua D. Coval, Jakib Jurek, and Erik Stafford, Working Paper No. 09-060 (Harvard Business School)
The Economics of Structured Finance, 4 (2008).
AAA rated, in contrast to less than 1 percent of corporate issues."84 The leading credit rating
agencies grew rich through rating mortgage-backed securities and CDOs. Total revenue for the
three firms doubled from $3 billion in 2002 to more than $6 billion in 2007. For instance,
Moody's profits quadrupled between 2000 and 2007.85 In fact, Moody's had the highest profit
margin of any company in the S&P 500 for five consecutive years. Financial firms also benefited
greatly from having high credit ratings, which allowed them to borrow at low rates on the short-
term markets to finance longer term and higher yielding investments, and to sell pledges of
various groups. The irony is that the issuers paid and chose the rating agencies that gave the
highest rating. In other words, the model of the dominant agencies is that securities issuers pay
for credit ratings, which can create a conflict of interest. Moreover, no one was rating the rating
agencies. For investors, the AAA-rated products that proved so lucrative for the rating agencies
were downgraded in the financial crisis. The inaccuracy of structured credit ratings has led to an
investigation into what went wrong with these ratings.
The first possible explanation of what went wrong with credit rating agencies can be
found in the models themselves. Rating agencies primarily relied on mathematical models that
estimated the loss distribution and simulated the cash flows of RMBS (Residential Mortgage
Backed Securities) and CDOs using historical data.86 The modeling of mortgage-related
securities by credit rating agencies contained mistaken assumptions about the independence of
the underlying mortgages. In addition, many of the rating agencies' models involved overly
optimistic assumptions about the direction of housing prices. When asked during a conference
84 Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 2008.
85 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis,
Rep. Henry A. Waxman Chairman (October 22, 2008).
86 Jeffrey David Manns, "Rating risk after the subprime mortgage crisis: A user fee approach for rating
agency accountability," North Carolina Law Review (forthcoming), 32-33.
call in March 2007 how a one-to-two percent decline in house prices over time would affect
Fitch's modeling of certain subprime-related securities, a Fitch representative conceded, "The
models would break down completely."8 7 The multiple rounds of structuring were another
problem for credit rating agencies. Three finance professors explained, "...even minute errors at
the level of the underlying securities, which would be insufficient to alter the security's rating,
can dramatically alter the ratings of the structured finance securities.8 8 ,
The second reason would be the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSRO) issue. The term was introduced in 1975, and at that time, nobody expected this term to
produce unintended effects. Major credit rating agencies could enjoy a protected status because
they were specially-designated credit rating agencies, or NRSROs. This situation naturally made
them more careless with the quality of their ratings. In fact, there is concern about the extent to
which state, federal, and global financial regulations are linked to private credit ratings.
The third reason would be "issuer pays" model. This model encourages "ratings
shopping" by issuers.8 9 This practice of charging issuers for their ratings began at Fitch and
Moody's in 1970 and at Standard & Poor's a few years later.90 The practice of collecting
payments from issuers can lower the rating quality.
To improve the credit rating system, first, credit rating agencies should note that
structured finance rating differs from traditional corporate debt ratings in that they are model-
based.
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Therefore, there is potential for significantly higher ratings volatility in certain
circumstances. Despite these differences, agencies applied the same rating categories to both
structured products and corporate bonds. Many investors did not understand, or fully appreciate,
the differences in risk characteristics between those products. Therefore, rating agencies should
disclose factual information to allow investors to reach their own conclusions regarding the risks
that structured finance securities pose. In other words, issuers, sponsors, and underwriters of
structured finance securities should be required to make available information about the key
parties, terms of the securities, legal structure, underlying asset pool, scenario-modeled cash
flows, sensitivities to timing, and other risks. Moreover, credit rating agencies should disclose
the quantitative and qualitative bases for their ratings of structured finance securities, including
the asset pool data used to produce the ratings, model parameters, key assumptions, and model
outputs under various scenarios. Investors should also have access to the assumptions about
future house price movements and broader economic conditions underlying the rating of
structured financial products.
To provide investors with additional information about the different risk characteristics
of structured products, agencies can use a separate rating scale or additional rating symbols for
structured products. These can signal to investors that the credit ratings of structured products
have different risk properties. However, at the same time, the introduction of a new, separate
rating system can also require fundamental changes to investment guidelines and to regulations
that reference credit ratings. Therefore, the introduction of a different rating system should be
subject to a review of its implications for markets and regulations.
Second, creating a review entity would be a solution. One of the important triggers of
the current turmoil was the NRSRO designation itself. In fact, it may be time to consider the
possibility of eliminating, or at least dramatically scaling back, the NRSRO designation and
replacing it.91 For example, even if an asset was awarded a good grade by a credit rating agency,
it would still not be added to a bank or pension fund portfolio unless the rating was also
approved by a credit rating review entity. The advantages of such a review entity approach are
that it would permit a dramatic opening of the market for private credit ratings and at the same
time discontinue the unsuccessful outsourcing of vital regulatory monitoring. Moreover, this
review entity would be better for public boards, such as non-profit corporations. In such a
scenario, the rating agencies can be forced to audit their ratings. With this process, the soundness
of the ratings agencies' methodologies can be ensured.
Third, for each rating, issuers could be required to pay a specific sum into a pool, from
which a rating agency would be chosen at random. 92 There is some disagreement about this
option because it might be difficult to maintain the quality of ratings after separating the link
between pay and performance. To improve incentives, the SEC or other regulatory bodies should
further encourage additional competition by progressively expanding the ranks of the NRSROs. 93
Fourth, government should not interfere in the rating determination process. For capital
markets to function most efficiently, credit rating agencies should be free to develop their rating
processes and methodologies as they see fit and to express their opinions.
Lastly, the regulatory frameworks should be globally consistent. Credit rating agencies
operate globally and affect capital markets worldwide. The differences between the United States
and European Union, however, still exist.
91 Frank Partnoy has suggested linking regulation instead to market-based measure of risk, such as credit
spreads or the prices of credit default swaps. Partnoy, supra note 100, 80-81.
92 David G. Raboy, Concept Paper on Credit Rating Agency Incentives (Jan. 9, 2009).
93 Hill, supra note 83, 86-87.
Chapter 8. Conclusion
In this thesis, various perspectives were offered to understand the 2007 financial crisis.
First, the housing bubble and burst were examined in detail. Cash inflows from China's
savings made cheap money available, and this made it possible for American people to borrow
money for houses easily, which led to the housing bubble. Moreover, free market capitalism and
Greenspan's faith in self-regulation played crucial roles in the housing and asset bubbles. After
all, the U.S. could not use all the money that was put into the financial system efficiently.
U.S. financial firms created many complicated products and did a lot of leveraging to
maximize their own profit. Naturally, the financial sector garnered economic and political power,
and Wall Street companies actually started to influence Washington.
After the housing bubble burst, many financial derivatives that were based on the
housing market, such as mortgage-backed-securities, experienced difficulties.
The U.S. economic crisis has many similarities with the Korean crisis of 1997. In fact, if
the Korean Letter of Intent is reviewed, it seems that the crisis recurred repeatedly:
Financial institutions have priced risks poorly and have been willing to finance an
excessively large portion of investment plans of the corporate sector, resulting in high
leveraging. At the same time, the dramatic decline in stock prices has cut the value of
banks' equity and further reduced their net worth.94
After the crisis, the Korean government rescued major banks, similar to the U.S.
government bailing out large financial firms.
94 Johnson and Kwak 2010, 56; Originally from Korean Letter ofintent to the IMF, supra note 1.
In fact, except for the Korean crisis, there were other similar financial crises before the
one in the U.S., such as Japan's post-bubble Great Recession in the 1990s or the Nordic
countries' crisis from 1992 to 1995. The scale of the banking problem could be different from
that of the U.S., but the nature of the banking problem is similar.
It is vitally important to understand why these kinds of crises keep happening by learning
lessons from them.
Government's responsibility to engage with the economic and political environment is
crucial. Financial regulators, banks, and the economic elite have made the U.S. financial system
less efficient and much more dangerous. The U.S. government would be well advised to
eliminate the Wall Street-Washington relationship and to consider steps for creating a fair
system.
Returning to Summer's argument mentioned in the introduction, Chapter 2 explained the
imbalances in U.S. trade and debt. Despite this imbalance, if one company had a stable and
reasonable financial system, the country would not face another financial meltdown but be able
to manage the high debt level.
To prevent the next financial crisis, the U.S. financial crisis was analyzed from six
perspectives: first, macroeconomic; second, banking; third, political; fourth, regulation system;
fifth, Black Swan; and sixth, credit rating agencies. In fact, these perspectives are not
independent but interconnected. Therefore, through these various perspectives, one can obtain a
clearer view about the detail of how the crisis happened and what must be done to avoid another
crisis. Personally, I agree with Volcker's rule, and I believe that financial industry reform must
be undertaken as soon as possible.
